Semiotics and Mimesis: Kristeva's Illumination and Sedgwick's Criticism of Girard's Triangle by Adam Christian, '00 Written for Literature, Interpretation, and Theory English 228, Professor Chang Drawing out the trajectories of semiotic and mimetic theory, Julia Kristeva manages to locate coordinates where the two discourses intersect. The convergence of these formerly unconnected fields illuminates the nature of certain structures in literature. Kristeva bridges her discussion of semiotic and mimetic theory in outlining the conditions of language, specifically the relationship between the subject and the object. Proceeding from the point of departure at which one field drifts into the next, one can view the Girardian model of triangular desire in more complex terms. Through a more comprehensive delineation of its underlying concepts, the model, which is intended to describe the dynamics of desire in triangular relations, can be separated into its critical components. Girard has both conflated and reduced these components. To show its relationship to Kristeva's work in semiotic and mimetic theory, the model will be unraveled following the logic of its construction. Once the blueprint of its structure has been outlined, it will be evaluated using Eve Sedgwick's criticism. Examining the operation of desire in Romantic novels, the Girardian model posits that desire is never linear: the subject does not simply covet an object. Prompting the subject's desire through his own impulse toward the same object, a mediating force determines the subject's desire. Without exception the genesis of desire has root in a third party, whose mediating presence can be real or imaginary. The autonomous individual is thus a myth in the Girardian model: "the romantic vaniteux always wants to convince himself [the subject] that his desire is written into the nature of things, or, which amounts to the same thing, that it is the emanation of serene subjectivity" (15). Girard embraces a notion of the subject involving a transcendental ego similarly appropriated by Kristeva, who firmly grounds her subject in language. More specifically, the subject is articulated through language. Kristeva borrows the phrase "the subject of enunciation" from Benveniste to evoke the relationship established between interlocutors where the speaking subject is defined in relation to the utterance. For Kristeva enunciation is at the nucleus of all language; it attributes a difference between the subject and object, which posit themselves in the world through its predicative act. Through the appropriation of the signifier "I" in discourse, the operating consciousness takes form in such an act. Correspondingly, the position of the object is articulated through its relation to "I." The predicative operation, simultaneously positing and naming the object, is thus thetic. Kristeva further elucidates the language act: it is "syntactic competence . . . as a product of the conscious or transcendental ego, which judges or speaks, and simultaneously brackets all that is heterogeneous to meaning" (31). Kristeva presents 'bracketing' as a linguistic activity in which a nominal category of things is formed. Denoting a subject and object, the thetic signifying function ultimately constitutes language. Thus the romantic vaniteux refuses to recognize his position as a subject within the broader linguistic network. Threatened by the object's ability to reject him, the romantic vaniteux disavows the thetic responsibility. Although Girard's object cannot interact with the subject in a reciprocal manner, the latter's inability to achieve it is tantamount to rejection. As a safeguard the vaniteux denies the existence of the mediator by projecting onto the object a false independence. As the guiding principle of Girard's triangular model, desire implies the subject's questioning of his power to possess a given object, which is often situated within an inaccessible realm. Outlining the path of desire, Kristeva points out:   The advent of Desire takes the following path. The articulation of self-consciousness begins when it loses the object &emdash; the other &emdash; with respect to which it was posited; this object is the 'simple and independent substance' . . . self-consciousness denies the object in order to return to itself . . . Desire is thus: the negation of the object in its alterity as an 'independent life' (133).   Kristeva identifies the regulating effects of desire, which Girard's scheme similarly roots in the 'Other' (Girard 16). In addition, the psychology of the subject is illuminated: the object represents a vehicle for the outlet, although not necessarily the fulfillment, of the subject's desire. That Kristeva establishes the relationship between the subject and object vis-á-vis desire shatters the guise of their independence in romantic novels. Both entities work in conjunction to conceal the presence of the mediator. Instead of operating from two sources, desire originates in the subject and acts toward the object. The very structure of the triangle limits reciprocity of the relationship because the object is incapable of asserting itself. The passivity of the object, which is usually a woman dominated by two men, motivates Kristeva's assertion of a maternal realm prior to the articulation of the subject and object. Such a realm, occurring before the acquisition of language and semantics, arranges logical categories according to the semiotic. Kristeva defines the passage into the linguistic order as the boundary between the modalities of the semiotic and symbolic. In her definition, the former is characterized by the operations of certain signifying practices such as art, poetry, and myth that are irreducible to a language object. Progressing toward the formation of a complete subject enabled to participate in language, the semiotic is initially located in discrete energies, arranged according to the constraints of social and family structures. Indeed, such a modality is identified in the Freudian psychic model; the subject can access the semiotic through the primary processes of condensation and displacement. Structuring these psychical "energies," called drives, is the responsibility of semiotic phase. Kristeva's semiotic chora describes "a nonexpressive totality formed by the drives and their ephemeral stases" (25). It designates a temporary articulation of the subject-in-process distinguished from an entity showing any geometric, temporal, or spatial development characteristic of the symbolic. Plato describes the chora as nourishing and maternal. Likewise, Kristeva places the origin of the drives around the mother's body, which becomes the ordering principle of the semiotic chora. The other modality is that of the symbolic realm in which language is a field of signifiers and signifieds. Its ordering principle is the paternal consciousness, which is associated with the thetic act. In analyzing romantic novels within the framework of his theory, Girard suggests the existence of the two realms more explicitly outlined by Kristeva. He encounters little recalcitrance in identifying the subjects, objects, and mediators that constitute triangular desire within most of the novels; however, his analysis is momentarily halted by Proust's insistence on "spontaneous desire and . . . a subjectivity almost divine in its autonomy" (28-9). Girard examines Proust's novel more closely to reveal the sources of mediation enshrouded in the plot structure that are acting upon a child's desire. Like Proust, Kristeva attributes a difference to her notion of the subject which is "not yet constituted as such" in the early semiotic phase of its development. Proust's insistence on the possibility of an autonomous child is justified: Girard's assertion that all desire is mediated in a social realm implies the existence of a pre-social realm in which desire between a subject and an object can be linear. Kristeva's attempt to isolate a pre-semantic space is based on the same logic. Negating the existence of Proust's pre-social realm, which is independent of social mediation, carries a weight equal and opposite to isolating Kristeva's pre-semantic space. The former act compels the regulation of desire in such a manner that reinforces the patriarchal structure of the social realm. The latter locates a space in which the paternal consciousness is absent and the semiotic chora dominates. Both Girard and Kristeva invoke a theoretical anterior phase as a mode of comparison to the symbolic order in which they are immersed. Before the infiltration of the symbolic, which causes the transition from a linear to triangular structure, the chora is regulated through an instinctual relationship with the mother. First, Kristeva attempts to isolate the signifying function that orchestrates "the connections between the body (in the process of constituting itself as a body proper), objects, and protagonists of family structure" (27). In the beginning, the chora denotes an amorphous identity; it becomes increasingly organized, however, through the mediating process of the symbolic order represented by the father. Likewise, Girard genders the forms of mediation occurring in literature: " . . . moments of ecstasy are always the result of feminine mediation . . . [the] Stendhal woman can be the mediatrix of peace and serenity after mediating desire, anguish, and vanity" (22). Unlike Kristeva, Girard's notion of the subject presupposes a location in the paternal sphere. Formerly a linear geometry between the mother and child (chora), the spatial metaphor of the triangle represents the entrance of the father into Girard's framework. In Kristeva's vocabulary, the definitions of the 'social' and 'symbolic' are practically synonymous:   In reading parallels or equivalencies that anthropology establishes between social symbolism and language, it is clear that the latter converge in a single place, which we have called the thetic, where positions and their syntheses (i.e. their relations) are set up (72). The institution of the symbolic order occurs through the social relations constructed by the family. Girard expands this scheme to explain relations beyond familial structures. The father occupies a position parallel to that of Girard's mediator. With the addition of a third dimension, the instinctual relationship is breached and the mother assumes a secondary access to the child. The father determines the mode of communication, which becomes thetic at the moment the chora is constituted and recognizes its difference from the mother. Kristeva examines the implications of the structural fact that language cannot exist without a thetic component. She proposes a restoration of the semiotic to displace the paternal consciousness . Because the chora precedes the establishment of the sign, it lacks the signifying capabilities that represent a passport into language: "the matrix of enunciation in narrative tends to center on an axial position that is explicitly or implicitly called 'I' or 'author' &emdash; a projection of the paternal role in the family" (91). Whether constructing a word or sentence, the author maintains his enunciative ability through the concrete identification of meaning and signification. According to Benveniste, 'I' establishes itself as the nexus through which other variables in a language system are understood. Determined by the father, a hierarchy of relations is thus inherent in the structure of language as well as narrative. Initiated into a realm of the paternal consciousness, the chora abandons its semiotic, maternal origins. The entrance of the chora into language is accompanied by a series of processes. The chora undergoes a metamorphosis facilitated by the symbolic order in which its pre-semantic signifying function fades into oblivion. The drive charges are absorbed and replaced by the sign. The subject-in-process assimilates and accepts the concept of the signifier. In specifying the process of the subject's transformation, Kristeva proclaims that "desire . . . designates the process of the subject's advent in the signifier through and beyond the needs of the drives" (130). Because the desired object must be posited through the signifying operation, participation in the Girardian model requires a condition of subjectivity. When Girard explains that imitation underlies desire, the overlap between semiotic and mimetic theory becomes more apparent: "So there is indeed an imitation of . . . desire, and even a very scrupulous imitation, since everything about the desire which is copied . . . depends upon the desire which serves as model" (6). Instead of following a primary route, the subject derives his conception of the object from the mediator. The integration of the two discourses demonstrates that the mimetic relationship is based on verisimilitudinous rather than original desire. Hence, the semiotic construction of the object is the product of two desires condensed to create the subject's illusion of linearity. In abbreviated form Kristeva explores the relevance of her work to the manifestation of the semiotic and symbolic orders in literature, which "has always been the most explicit realization of the signifying subject's condition" (Kristeva 82). Instead, her primary concern is isolating a pre-semantic signifying function and illuminating its relationship to linguistic, psychoanalytic, and anthropological fields. Focused on reactivating the semiotic through poetry, Kristeva largely ignores the value of her analysis of the subject-in-process in relation to literature. Indeed, the structure of narrative in literature is predicated on a subject from whose perspective the story is articulated; in the case of Girard, the novel is the center of interest. My reorientation of Kristeva's work toward literature attempts to recognize that her stakes in reclaiming literature's power of cultural representation are, in some respects, higher than those in language. In rejecting any discourse of representation in specifying the chora, Kristeva renders futile her attempt to reactivate the semiotic. It is impossible not to posit oneself as a subject in gaining access to language. Such a strategy denies the chora the possibility of entering into the symbolic order on a level playing field. Kristeva does not intend to create a separate, competing realm: "the reinstatement of maternal territory into the very economy of language does not lead its questioned subject-in-process to repudiate its symbolic disposition" (Adams 1169). Her isolation of a pre-semantic signifying function attempts to amplify the ability of the semiotic to negotiate and redefine the patriarchal structure of language. Compared to other media, literature yields much more easily to this task. Girard's theory of triangular desire reinforces the patriarchal structure which Kristeva attempts to dismantle in the context of language instead of literature. Eve Sedgwick's criticism of Girard's triangular offers an approach different from that of Kristeva, who suggests the shortcomings of this model. Sedgwick combats the constraints of the paternal order through a revision of the Girardian model's treatment of women. Under the current framework, women become commodities of exchange between the male subject and mediator. Their value is assigned by the relative desires of the latter. Kristeva believes that anthropology consistently confirms the connection between the social organization and the symbolic value of the object. Indeed, within societies the various means of self-regulation include the exchange of women (72). The power relations reflected in societal structures manifest themselves in literature as well. The structure of Girard's triangle reinforces the interests of men and the domination of women: "it is the use of women as an exchangeable, perhaps symbolic, property for the primary purpose of cementing the bonds of men with men . . . as a 'conduit of a relationship' in which the true partner is a man" (Sedgwick 26). To identify the effects of power relations between the subject and object, Sedgwick focuses on gender difference in her analysis of literature. Despite its foundation on semiotic and mimetic theory, Girard's triangular structure presents a gender asymmetry that Kristeva reconciles into semiotic and symbolic orders. Her approach attempts to restore the presence of the former to rectify the asymmetry. In doing so, gender is essentialized to embody a particular type of literature. Such associations are not necessarily valid; constructing a dichotomy polarizes the purposes of poetry and communication. In effect, Kristeva introduces the problem of biological difference and overlooks the more practical approach of Sedgwick. While providing insight into Girard's triangle, Kristeva ultimately defeats her own purpose by preserving the boundary between the pre-semantic signifying function and the "paternal" consciousness. From Sedgwick it is evident that one must collapse such a distinction before the reality of power relations within a patriarchal structure can be effectively addressed.           Bibliography     Girard, René. Deceit, Desire, and the Novel: Self and Other in Literary Structure. Trans. Yvonne Freccero. Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins U. P. Kristeva, Julia. Revolutions in Poetic Language. New York, NY: Columbia U. P., 1984.   &emdash;&emdash;&emdash;&emdash;. "From One Identity to Another." Critical Theory Since Plato. Ed. Hazard Adams. Revised ed. New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich College Publishers, 1992.   Sedgwick, Eve. Between Men: English Literature and Male Homosocial Desire. New York, NY: Columbia U. P., 1985. Articles are copyrighted by their authors. They may not be redistributed in whole or in part without prior written permission. You may make copies for your own private use, but include this copyright notice and proper attribution to the author.